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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to present a tool, that can check if programs, compiled to
Java Virtual Machine bytecode, are exception safe. The tool performs static analysis of in-
put programs by reducing the programs to Horn Clause systems and solving the generated
systems in the automatic theorem prover. The current version of the tool is publicly avail-
able in the Bitbucket repository. The tool can be used for custom constraint verification,




Static program analysis is the analysis of computer software without executing its code.
This technique is used for verifying certain properties of the given code and finding errors
before runtime. The primary advantage of this approach is that it is does not require gen-
erating exhaustive test cases and running the program multiple times with different inputs,
which can be non-trivial and time consuming. Today static analysis tools are widely used
in the industry for tracking simple bugs and enforcing coding standards.
There are several implementations of static analysis of Java source code. Such tools
as Find Bugs[1] and JLint[2] focus on the syntactic analysis of the program and match
source code to known patterns of suspicious programming practice. Extended Static Check-
ing System for Java[3] implements a model checking approach to verify a given program
against user-defined loop invariants. Overall, the majority static analysis tools for Java are
able to detect simple bugs (such as undeclared variables), enforce syntactic standards and
check the code against simple invariants (e.g. some variable is greater than zero before and
after a loop).
However, there is no software that can statically analyze a program and identify if it
throws a runtime exception, which is not related to a simple syntax error, but rather caused
by the pitfall of the algorithm. Software that analyses the code syntactically cannot find
complex errors, while current tools that use model checking require users to define their
own constraints, which can become very challenging and code-specific if they are trying to
model runtime exceptions. In addition, checking for exceptions becomes non-trivial in the
presence of all features of Java Virtual Machine programming languages such as branches,
method calls and sub-classing.
This research project attempts to address the outlined issue in the static analysis field
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by developing a tool that will use model checking to prove or disprove that a given Java
Virtual Machine code snippet can produce runtime exceptions. In particular, this project is
targeting Array Index Out of Bounds Exception, Null Pointer Exception, Class Cast Excep-
tion, and Division by Zero Exception. This research will model the listed exceptions using
Horn clauses, translate the given code into the same form and use an automatic theorem
prover to check if these exceptions are possible in the given code.
This paper provides an overview of two major approaches to static program analysis
and a summary of currently existing tools that are able to analyze code statically in the Lit-
erature Review section. The implementation section guides the reader through the structure
of our application and provides pointers to open source libraries that were used to build the
project. The pointer to the current project code base and the summary of tool functionality
is provided in the Results section, while the Discussion section lists multiple applications




Static program analysis approach is mostly used for verifying certain program properties of
the code. Static analysis is very efficient, because it allows users to bypass manual testing
of numerous inputs. Static analysis applications need to be executed only once in order to
infer program properties.
Static program analyses are divided two major areas: syntactic analysis and semantic
analysis. Syntactic analysis checks the text in the provided source code for syntax errors,
while semantic analysis involves an in-depth processing of the program and derivation of
its properties.
This project focuses on developing a tool that will semantically analyze programs be-
fore runtime, written in languages that can be compiled to Java Virtual Machine (JVM)
bytecode such as Java, Scala and Python. In particular, the application will prove or dis-
prove that a given JVM code can throw an exception: an error in the program that disrupts
its normal flow and leads to an undefined outcome. This project is targeting Java exceptions
that are caused by accessing an invalid memory address in the given context, performing
incompatible data type conversion and diving by zero.
2.1 Syntactic Analysis
Currently, the majority of static program analysis tools for Java employ syntactic analysis
and focus on enforcing coding standards or detecting syntax errors in the code. Such ap-
plications as Find Bugs [1], JLint [2] and PMD [4] verify that each line of a given code
segment is syntactically correct and does not contain unsafe programming practices. This
approach is useful for identifying simple bugs before runtime. However, it does not an-
alyze the code in depth, and, as a result, can produce false warnings that actually do not
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correspond to errors in the code. In addition, syntactic code analysis is not able to check
the code for more complex errors such as accessing an invalid memory address. Overall,
syntactic code analysis is effective only when it comes to detection of simple bugs in the
code.
2.2 Model Checking
Model checking is a technique used for semantic program analysis. This approach ad-
dresses a problem of verifying certain properties in a given program. Lazy Abstraction with
Interpolants [5] algorithm uses Craig Interpolants (logical formulas that are constructed
from a limited set of variables) to model relationships between program variables. The
outlined procedure generates a set of logical expressions at given program point and com-
pares them to statements generated at previous program points in order to construct a Craig
Interpolant that proves or disproves that a certain program point is reachable. The algo-
rithm can apply these statements multiple times, if they show up in multiple paths. Also, it
builds invariants by analyzing infeasible paths. This procedure is very efficient, because it
generates statements only for one program point at a time and, therefore, does not require
analyzing program paths that are not taken. Moreover, Lazy Abstraction does not require
the strongest statements about each program point, which allows reusing the same state-
ments for different program paths and reduces processing time. Even though this algorithm
has been implemented in Z3 [6] as Duality Horn Clause Solver [7], the tool has not mod-
eled Java semantics. Lazy Abstraction algorithm provides an answer to a model checking
problem, which cannot be applied to a Java code snippet.
Extended Static Checking System for Java [3] also uses model checking for testing
Java programs. It takes in preconditions, post conditions and loop invariants in the form of
special comments from a programmer and uses an automatic theorem prover [6] to verify
that the program matches provided specifications. This tool is useful for verifying loop
invariants that involve variables in a given code (for example, verifying that a variable is
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non-negative before and after the loop). It is highly customizable, because the end user is
allowed to define any program constraints. However, coming up with constraints that model
Java exceptions in a given environment is non-trivial and requires generating a different set
of expressions for every program. Extended Static Checking System for Java verifies loop
invariants, but it cannot be widely used by programmers for detecting exceptions, because
it requires complex user input and, therefore, reduces efficiency benefits of static program
analysis.
Bandera tool [8] partially tackled the problem of automatic exception checking with-
out intensive user input. Bandera analyzes code for exceptions related to multithreading
execution of multiple program paths at the same time. The tool uses model checking to
verify that uncorrupted shared data will be accessible to all of the threads at some point
of execution. However, Bandera cannot analyze Java library calls, which greatly limits the
usability of this application. Overall, this tool targets issues that come with parallelism and
omits analyzing sequential parts of the program in detail. In addition, Bandera cannot be
used for debugging real-world applications, because the majority of the software contains
some kind of Java library call.
2.3 Exception Modeling
Currently, there is no tool that can effectively verify that sequential Java Virtual Machine
programs do not throw exceptions. Software that employs syntactic analysis cannot detect
the majority of exceptions, while model checking tools require complicated user input that
has to be designed for each program individually. This project will produce model checking
software, which will automatically generate constraints for a given program that correspond
to common Java exceptions and verify that those constraints hold in the provided code
snippet. The resulting application will be able to determine if a program can throw an





The tool takes in any source code, that can be compiled using Java Virtual Machine (JVM)
[9] as a parameter and transforms it into a bytecode. At this point the tool is concerned
with analyzing bytecode. The assembly code will be translated into a set of Horn Clauses
- logical expressions, that define relationships between program variables in the rule-like
form (e.g X =⇒ Y ). In addition, the tool generates assertions that involve variables
from the input program to represent certain Java exceptions. The tool will test if two sets
of generated expressions are mutually exclusive in The Z3 Theorem Prover [6]. Mutually
exclusive sets of expressions correspond to an exception-safe code, while sets with non-
conflicting expressions will indicate a possibility of an exception in the code.
Figure 3.1 provides an overview of safety verification process, implemented in the tool.
The outlined algorithm preserves and analyzes all properties of the program, due to
generation of a separate Horn Clause at each program point. Therefore, this procedure will
give valid conclusions about program safety.
The project is written in OCaml [10] programming language, due to its efficiency and
availability of libraries for static analysis.
3.2 Representating Java ByteCode
Java bytecode, produced by Java compiler, is very tedious to manipulate, because it in-
cludes many JVM-specific details, such as stack-based implementation. In order to avoid
dealing with low-level assembly details, the project took advantage of Sawja [11] - a mod-
ule that translates JVM bytecode into OCaml types and data structures. Particularly, the
6
Figure 3.1: An overview of safety verification process.
tool uses methods from such modules as Javalib, JBasics, Sawja pack and JProgram to ob-
tain a Java bytecode representation, suitable for program analysis. In addition to parsing
program statements, we also keep track of data types, classes and method calls.
3.3 Project Architecture
Once Sawja bytecode representation is obtained, it undergoes two more transformations.
At first, the code is translated into intermediate language, defined in OCaml, that represents
Horn Clauses. Then this intermediate representation is used for creating Z3 statements. As
7
a result, the project consists of three major layers, shown in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Three major layers of the project.
We chose to insert an additional layer between Sawja bytecode and Z3 call intentionally
due to the following reasons:
1. It is possible to optimize an intermediate representation of the code before calling
Z3.
2. It reduces the degree of dependence on Z3 and makes it easier to invoke another
theorem prover if needed.
3. It provides an additional layer of abstraction, which isolates the programmer from
Z3-specific details.
3.4 Intermediate Representation
In order to generate an intermediate representation of the code, the tool iterates over each
program statement and determines Horn Clauses that represent a transition between pro-
gram states, expressed in program variables.
Since Java bytecode has a finite number of instructions, we came up with a mapping of
how each instruction alters previously generated predicate (a logical expression that can be
either true or false). In addition, we are computing the next program state for each Horn
Clause, derived from a given instruction. The resulting Horn Clause has the following
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format:
Predicate1 ∧ Predicate2 ∧ ... ∧ Predicaten =⇒ Next program state
Particular Java features such as if statements and loops require more than one Horn
Clause in order to model all possible transitions. If statements produce a separate Horn
Clause for each possible path of program execution. All boolean conditions from the if
statement necessary to take a certain branch get added to the set of predicates, while the
path in question gets represented as next program state in the Horn Clause. As a result, if
statements get modeled as follows:
if(Condition1) Path1 7→ Condition1 =⇒ Path1
if(Condition2) Path2 7→ Condition2 =⇒ Path2
...
if(Conditionn) Pathn 7→ Conditionn =⇒ Pathn
Representing loops with Horn Clauses requires coming up with loop invariants - pred-
icates that do not change throughout the course of the loop execution. The tool also estab-
lishes the termination condition of the loop - a condition that determines if and when the
loop terminates. Combining these pieces of information together produces Horn Clauses
in the format specified below:
(Predicates before the loop)∧¬(Termination condition) =⇒ Beginning of the loop
(Loop invariants) ∧ ¬(Termination condition) =⇒ Beginning of the loop
(Loop invariants) ∧ (Termination condition) =⇒ End of the loop
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An example in Figure 3.3 illustrates how a basic code snippet is represented as a set of
Horn Clauses:
1 i n t i = 0 ;
2 whi le ( i < N)
3 i += 2 ;
4 done ;
5 a s s e r t ( i % 2) == 0 ;
Figure 3.3: Initial pseudocode.
This pseudocode will result in the following Horn Clause representation:
i = 0 =⇒ R(i)
R(i) ∧ (i < N) =⇒ R(i+ 2)
R(i) ∧ (i ≥ N) =⇒ i mod 2 = 0
Figure 3.4: A set of generated Horn Clauses
3.5 Modeling Exceptions
Exceptions are modeled as a separate set of assertions over given program variables that
needs to be verified. However, we ignore the properties, inferred from the program and
focus on the details of the exception. We construct an expression, representing the excep-
tion based on two factors: the semantics of the exception itself and variables present in the
program.
3.5.1 Division by Zero Exception
Every time there is a division in the code, the tool will generate an assertion that the divisor
in the expression is equal to 0.
3.5.2 Array Index Out of Bounds Exception
Each access of an array (e.g. element = A[i]) in the code produces an assertion that
i >= N , where N is the declared size of the array. The array size is maintained per each
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instantiated array.
3.5.3 Null Pointer Exception
Whenever there is an operation or a method call on an object for the first time after decla-
ration of modification, there is an assertion that Object == NULL
3.5.4 Class Cast Exception
Each time there is a cast of one class into another, there is an assertion that two classes are
incompatible. Consider the following code fragment:
1 C l a s s 1 a = new C l a s s 1 ( ) ;
2 C l a s s 2 b = ( C l a s s 2 ) a ; / / c l a s s c a s t i n g t a k e s p l a c e
The generated assertion corresponds to this pseudocode:
assert(Class2 (is not a parent of) Class1)
Class hierarchy will be derived from Sawja bytecode representation.
3.6 Representation for a Theorem Prover
We are using The Z3 Theorem Prover as an engine for solving Horn Clauses. Therefore,
the intermediate representation of the code is converted into Z3 programming language. In
particular, the tool takes advantage of such features as assertions, propositional logic and
iterations over a set of possible solutions. The tool has to be run in set-logic HORN
mode. Each operation present in the intermediate representation of the code is mapped to a
number of statements in Z3. Transitions between program states are translated into invari-
ants, defined as function declarations (predicates in the Horn Clause), boolean expressions,
and logical implications (next program state in the Horn Clause) between them. Exceptions
are modeled as assertions that involve program variables.
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As an example, Horn Clauses from Figure 3.4 get translated into the following Z3
statements:
1 ( s e t−l o g i c HORN)
2 ( d e c l a r e−fun R ( I n t ) Bool )
3
4 ( a s s e r t
5 (R 0) )
6
7 ( a s s e r t
8 ( f o r a l l
9 ( ( i I n t ) (N I n t ) )
10 (=>
11 ( and
12 (R i )
13 (< i N) )
14 (R
15 (+ i 2 ) ) ) ) )
16
17 ( a s s e r t
18 ( f o r a l l
19 ( ( i I n t ) (N I n t ) )
20 (=>
21 ( and
22 (R i )
23 ( n o t
24 (< i N) ) )
25 (=
26 ( mod i 2 )
27 0 ) ) ) )
28
29 ( check−s a t )
30 ( ge t−model )
12
Since there is a Z3 module for Ocaml [12], we could easily integrate Z3 call into the
tool. Z3 takes in generated Horn Clauses and assertions and automatically solves a given
system of logical constraints. If there a solution under which all of the Clauses are valid
entailments, then the program is not exception-safe. However, if there is no solution to
a given system of constraints, then the code will not throw exceptions in question at any




The current implementation of the project is publicly available at the Bitbucket repository
[13].
The resulting tool has the following functionality:
• Translating the code, that can be compiled to the JVM bytecode, into a system of
Horn Clauses, defined in terms of variables, present in the program.
• Checking the input code against custom assertions, specified by the user with the
Assert statement.
• Checking if the code can produce Array Index Out of Bounds Exception, Null Pointer
Exception, Class Cast Exception and Division by Zero Exception.
After analyzing the input code, the tool outputs sat or unsat result. sat statement
means that the program may produce an exception at some point of its execution, while
unsat implies that the program is exception safe.
In order to observe the functionality of the tool, consider checking the code snippet in
Figure 4.1 for Division by Zero Exception. The tool produces unsat output, because there
is no integer y such that 5 ∗ y + 1 = 0, while the expression 5 ∗ y + 1 is the only source
of potential exception. On the other hand, similar analysis of code snippet on Figure 4.2
results in satoutput in the tool, indicating that the program is not exception-safe. Indeed,
if x = 2, then y = 1 and 5 ∗ y − 5 = 5 ∗ 1− 5 = 0.
The set of test cases that were used to evaluate the correctness of the tool is available
in the test folder in the repository. In particular, the tests contained linear programs, condi-
tional programs, function calls and loops.
14
1 i n t y ;
2 i n t z ;
3 / / x i s a v a r i a b l e , t h a t was d e f i n e d i n t h e code e a r l i e r
4 i f ( x % 2 == 1) {
5 y = x + 1 ;
6 }
7 e l s e {
8 y = x / 2 ;
9 }
10 z = 10 / (5 ∗ y + 1) ;
Figure 4.1: Initial Java code
1 i n t y ;
2 i n t z ;
3 / / x i s a v a r i a b l e , t h a t was d e f i n e d i n t h e code e a r l i e r
4 i f ( x % 2 == 1) {
5 y = x + 1 ;
6 }
7 e l s e {
8 y = x / 2 ;
9 }
10 z = 10 / (5 ∗ y − 5) ;
Figure 4.2: Modified Java code
Since the tool has successfully passed all of the provided test cases, it can be inferred





The resulting application provides static checking against Array Index Out of Bounds Ex-
ception, Null Pointer Exception, Class Cast Exception, Division by Zero Exception, and
user-defined constraints. The tool automatically generates all the necessary constraints that
model the input program as well as safety statements, allowing the programmer to bypass
manual analysis and constraint generation for each individual program. The tool provides
a new level of automation for code testing, since the user does not have to provide any
input to the tool, besides the program that needs to be tested, while previous static analysis
tools did not support exception-modeling semantics [1, 2, 4] or required additional user
input [3]. As a result, the tool can significantly increase the speed of code testing during
software development.
5.2 Horn Clause Generation
The tool reduces the input program to Horn Clause system before checking if the program
is exception-safe. The functionality of reducing a program to a set of Horn Clauses can be
used separately from the rest of the tool for other applications of model checking, such as
analysis of information flow in the program and proof of equivalence of two programs.
Information flow analysis may employ Hoare-style framework to represent total or par-
tial transfer of information from highly secure variables to the program output [14]. Barthe
et al. represents secure information flow by self-composition - a procedure that constructs
a program, which is identical to the input program, but with different variable names, mod-
els both programs as one system of Horn Clauses and makes an assertion that equivalent
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inputs produce equivalent outputs [15]. Other researchers that work on information flow
analysis similarly use approaches that involve constructing a Horn Clause system from a
given program [16, 17].
Proving that two input are equivalent (if given two equivalent inputs, they are guaran-
teed to produce equivalent outputs) also involves solving Horn Clause systems.De Angelis
et al. developed algorithms that verify relational properties between two programs by trans-
forming Horn Clause representations of the programs [18, 19].
Therefore, modeling an input program as a set of Horn Clauses is a common technique
used in various applications of static analysis. Since the developed tool can be used as a
standalone Horn-Clause generator, the applications of the project go beyond safety check-
ing. In particular, our tool can produce Horn Clauses that can be used for other kinds of
static analysis.
5.3 Limitations
The current version of the tool has several limitations. The tool was not extensively tested
and it is not known if it can be used on the real-life programs. In addition, the current
automatic theorem prover used for the tool [6] is not able to solve non-linear Horn Clause
systems. For instance, if the input program is reduced to a non-linear system, the tool may
not produce a concrete sat or unsat and return unknown instead, meaning, that it is not
able to verify if the given program is exception-safe. The project also does not support the
analysis of multithreaded programs, since accesses of the shared data and lock semantics
are not modeled by this tool.
5.4 Future Work
The project was tested only on trivial toy programs, that are shorter than 100 lines of code.
Therefore, the tool requires more extensive testing that employs complex real-life bench-
marks. Specifically, the project needs more testing on programs that involve non-linear
17
arithmetic in order to determine the possible limitations of the project. In addition, the
performance of the tool needs to be evaluated using large benchmarks that contain several
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